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1 Introduction 
In little more than half a century, the EU (including its predecessors) has undergone deep and 
wide-ranging transformations. It has grown from being a rather lose grouping of six Western 
European nations to include most European countries, spanning from the Baltic to the Black 
Sea and from the Iberian to the Balkan peninsula. In the process, the European Union has 
become increasingly heterogenous. It now counts 27 member countries with diverse historical 
legacies (from the Roman Empire in the West to the Russian and Ottoman Empires in the 
East), dramatically different levels of economic development (ranging from rich Luxembourg 
to poor Bulgaria), various cultural and religious traditions, and a multitude of languages. On 
the last criterion, the diversity of Europe is perhaps at its most evident: the EU counts 23 
official languages at present, compared with just four at the time of its founding.  
The list of official EU languages includes some that are spoken by large numbers of 
people in Europe: German is spoken by approximately 85 million Europeans while English, 
French and Italian are each spoken by around 60 million. Some of the official EU languages 
are also spoken widely outside of Europe: besides English, Spanish and Portuguese are 
notable examples. On the other hand, several of the official languages are spoken by relatively 
few: Estonian and Slovene are spoken by approximately 1-2 million while Maltese and Irish 
are spoken by around half million each (moreover, the majority of speakers of Maltese and 
Irish are also fluent in English, another official EU language). This linguistic diversity reflects 
an overwhelming desire for equality: when joining, each member nation was allowed to put 
forward its national language as an official language of the EU and all its institutions. The 
only nation that has not done so has been Luxembourg (Luxembourgish is used by the EU as 
a treaty language only).  
Despite this apparent desire for equality, several languages stand out because of their 
omission. Russian, Turkish and Arabic are spoken by large numbers of Europeans (4.2, 2.2 
and 1.6 million EU citizens, respectively), yet they do not enjoy the official status. Regional 
languages are similarly not included, even though some enjoy official or semi-official status 
in their own country. Catalan, spoken by 4.1 million European, is the most prominent 
example, followed by Galician and Basque.1  
In the near future, the list of official EU languages can grow further by adding Croatian, 
Icelandic and Turkish. The last language can get an official status either in the wake of 
Turkey‟s accession to the EU or because of the reunification of Cyprus. Moreover, Spain‟s 
regions are increasingly vocal in their quest for recognition of their languages. It is therefore 
conceivable that the EU might have as many as 30 official languages in a few years from 
now.  
Multilingualism in the EU stands in sharp contrast with the practice in most nation-states. 
The vast majority of countries in Europe are multi-lingual, with several regional and/or 
ethnic-minority languages spoken within their territories. However, most of them espouse 
                                                 
1 All of the above figures refer to the number of native speakers of the various languages as estimated by 
extrapolating from the 2005 Eurobarometer survey (discussed below) mapping the landscape of languages in 
Europe. As such, these figures count all native speakers of a given language, not only those in the original 
country of that language. Only EU citizens are included in the count, thus counting in intra-EU migrants but 
excluding non-European immigrants. Russian native speakers can be found especially in the Baltic countries as 
well as in Germany. Turkish is spoken mainly in Germany and Bulgaria. The highest numbers of Arabic 
speakers are in France, Germany, Italy, UK and Belgium. The bulk of Catalan and Basque speakers live in 
Spain, with smaller numbers (much smaller in case of Catalan) found in France.  
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strictly monolingual regimes when it comes to official languages, with only a few granting 
official or semi-official status to regional languages.  
The practical and economic implications of multilingualism in the EU are wide-ranging. 
Official documents must be translated into all official languages. National representatives and 
members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are free (and often expressly expected) to use 
their own language when conducting official EU business. EU citizens similarly are entitled 
to use their language when communicating with European institutions. Implementing such 
extensive multilingualism is expensive: running translation and interpretation services for the 
EU of 27 member countries costs over € 1 billion annually. It also takes time: translation of 
official documents into all official languages can take many months. As a result, legal 
decisions adopted by the EU are often implemented with several months‟ delay (legal 
decisions only become valid once they were published in all official languages). The process 
is prone to errors too, in part because of the growing use of „relay translations‟ whereby a 
document or spoken word is translated from one language to another via a „core‟ language 
such as English, German or French.  
In this article, I discuss multilingualism in the EU and its economic implications as well 
as analyze some of the alternative arrangements that could be implemented. In the following 
section, I start by presenting the basic facts about multilingualism and language use in 
Europe. In that section, I outline the benefits of multilingualism, mainly embodied in avoiding 
linguistic disenfranchisement, and discuss the prominence of the various European languages 
in the linguistic landscape of Europe. The analysis documents a clear disconnect between the 
firm commitment of the EU to maintaining multilingualism in its institutions and the revealed 
preferences of Europeans: concerning the latter, the people of Europe increasingly coordinate 
on choosing English as their lingua franca. The following section then complements the 
discussion of benefits by analyzing the costs of multilingualism. Furthermore, by combining 
the discussion of benefits and costs of multilingualism, I outline the analytical foundations for 
identifying an optimal linguistic regime. Finally, the last section summarizes the main 
findings and argues that extensive multilingualism is neither economically optimal at present 
nor sustainable in the long term. If political constraints prevent the EU from streamlining its 
linguistic regime, then the most likely outcome is linguistic reform coming in through the 
back door: full range of linguistic services will be maintained for a small subset of official 
languages while the quality and range of services provided in the remaining languages will 
gradually deteriorate.  
 
2 Languages in the EU: Stylized Facts and Economic Background 
At the beginning of 2004, the EU had 11 official languages. After the enlargement in May of 
that year, which brought in ten new member countries, the number of official languages has 
almost doubled, to 20 (Cyprus was the only new member country that did not bring with itself 
a new official language). In 2005, Ireland requested a (somewhat limited) official status for 
Irish.2 By 2007, with the EU accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the number of official 
languages has grown thus to 23.  
The right of each member state to nominate its national language as an official language 
of the EU has been enshrined in the Treaty of Rome and in Regulation 1/1958. The six 
founding countries shared four official languages between them: French, German, Italian and 
                                                 
2 The implementation of this decision was postponed until 2007 because of the lack of qualified translators and 
interpreters.  
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Dutch (Luxembourg has never requested the same privilege for Luxembourgish, which is one 
of its three official languages). Subsequently, following the principle of equality, full 
recognition of national languages was extended to all new members. This has increased the 
workload of the EU DGs Translation and Interpretation dramatically. The vast majority (72%) 
of EU documents is currently prepared initially in English3. With 23 official languages, each 
document must be therefore translated 22 times. Moreover, the number of possible 
combinations requiring translation or interpretation is increasing more than proportionately to 
the number of languages: with 23 official languages, there are 506 such combinations, 
compared to 110 when the EU counted 11 official languages and 12 combinations when the 
EU was founded in 1957.4 The linguistic services now cost the EU more than € 1 billion 
annually: approximately one-fifth of its administrative budget and one-seventh of the amount 
spent on average annually on R&D within the FP7 Program.  
Linguistic policy is one of the areas where any amendment of the existing practice 
requires unanimity. Therefore, even if it were in the interest of the majority of EU citizens to 
demote certain languages, for instance those spoken by relatively few, to a status lower than 
that of an official EU language, proposing such a change would be futile as at least the 
country whose language would be affected would be certain to oppose it. It is for this reason 
that the linguistic regime put in place in 1957 has been maintained until present. 
Multilingualism was easy to implement – and may have been optimal – when the EU had six 
members and four languages, none of which had a clear claim to superiority. It is far from 
obvious that it is optimal – or even sustainable – at present with 27 members and 23 
languages.  
Multilingualism delivers two kinds of benefits to the member countries and their citizens. 
First, being recognized as an official EU language promotes the international standing and 
prestige of the language and, indirectly, of its people. This intangible benefit is likely to be 
important especially to small countries. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
Maltese government institutions now make more use of Maltese at the expense of English 
(both languages have official status in Malta) now that the EU institutions use Maltese for 
official business with their country. Estonian and Irish may be enjoying similar boosts, 
following decades of domination by Russian and English, respectively.5 The EU also helps 
boost the status of such small languages by hiring translators and interpreters and often 
actually directly financing their training6: this serves to increase the expected return on 
investing in acquiring proficiency in these languages and thus encourages their teaching and 
use (especially since not all of those who learn a language because of the prospect of a career 
in EU institutions will eventually land in such jobs). These benefits help explain why regions 
such as Catalonia strive to achieve similar recognition for their languages. Large countries 
benefit as well, especially if their languages get to be used as working languages by EU 
bureaucrats: French and German are thus elevated to the status of EU linguae francae, at par 
(at least in theory) with English. While such intangible benefits are clearly important, it is 
very difficult to quantify or measure them, in part because of the missing counterfactual: one 
cannot evaluate properly the impact of EU multilingualism on the status of languages such as 
                                                 
3 See “EU translation policy here to stay”, EurActiv report http://www.euractiv.com/en/culture/eu-translation-
policy-stay/article-170516.  
4 This calculation treats translation from, say, French to English as being different from that from English to 
French.  
5 The fact that Irish MEPs were not able to use Irish in the European Parliament until 2007 was a source of 
considerable irritation to some Irish representatives in that body.  
6 For example, see “EU still chasing Maltese translators,” Malta Today, 17 February 2008, 
http://archive.maltatoday.com.mt/2008/02/17/n4.html.  
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Irish or Maltese because we do not know how those languages would have developed without 
being official languages of the EU.  
Second, multilingualism also bestows important practical, tangible, benefits to EU 
citizens by ensuring that they have access to EU legal documents without requiring 
translation, that they can communicate with EU institutions in their own language and that 
their elected representatives can use their language when participating in EU decision making. 
Ginsburgh and Weber (2005) denote this second effect as linguistic disenfranchisement, 
reflecting the fact that those whose languages are not used by the EU would see their 
linguistic rights curtailed and would be unable to participate fully in the EU political process 
and decision making.  
While the intangible benefits of multilingualism cannot be quantified, preventing 
disenfranchisement can be assessed formally by estimating how many people would be 
disenfranchised under a given linguistic regime. It is important to realize in this context that a 
person will not be linguistically disenfranchised as long as the EU uses a language that they 
can speak, whether or not it is their native language. Again, this goes back to the distinction 
between tangible and intangible benefits of multilingualism discussed above: a Maltese native 
speaker who also speaks English and Italian is not linguistically disenfranchised as long as the 
EU uses English or Italian as official languages but fails to enjoy the intangible benefit unless 
Maltese is adopted as an official language as well. However, the same applies to, for example, 
ethnic Turk with German nationality or Spaniard who is an ethnic Catalan. Therefore, in my 
discussion of the costs and benefits of multilingualism, I will consider only the tangible 
benefits and will disregard the intangible effects.  
At the time the EU institutions were being shaped, multilingualism made good sense for 
two reasons: the EEC started off with only small number of countries and languages (six and 
four, respectively), and relatively few people spoke the languages of other countries. At 
present, neither condition continues to hold: the EU has expanded repeatedly and many 
Europeans are proficient in foreign languages. A recent survey documented the languages 
spoken by the nationals of all 27 member countries of the EU. This survey contains extensive 
information on the use of all official EU languages as well as some additional languages 
(Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Turkish as well as some European regional languages and 
languages spoken by selected ethnic minorities).7 Two percent of Europeans have two (or 
more) mother‟s tongues (the share of multilinguals is at its highest in Ireland and Spain, at 8% 
in both countries). 39% speak at least one foreign language (ranging between 17% in Hungary 
and 97% in Luxembourg) and 14% speak two or more foreign languages (from 4% in Ireland 
to 84% in Luxembourg). However, not all languages are equally popular. In fact, with the 
exception of English, French, German, Spanish and Russian, few European languages are 
spoken outside of their home country.8 This is illustrated by Figures 1-3 (adopted from 
Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 2010) which show the fraction of each country‟s population speaking 
the three most popular languages, English, French and German; the figures combine native 
speakers with those who speak each language as a foreign language but with good or very 
good (self-assessed) proficiency. Table 1 contains the detailed figures, along with similar 
numbers for additional languages. In the vast majority of European countries, at least 10% of 
the population speak English (Hungary is the only exception with 8% English speakers). 
There are several countries with more than half of the population proficient in English: 
                                                 
7 Special Eurobarometer 243: Europeans and their Languages, November-December 2005. Note that in order to 
be included in the survey, the respondents had to be EU citizens, though not necessarily nationals of the country 
in which they were interviewed.  
8 The figures quoted above count all those who speak the language as a foreign language, including foreigners in 
that languages home country.  
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besides the English-speaking countries, these are Cyprus, Denmark, Malta, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. The shares of French and German speakers, in contrast, are considerably lower 
(the Netherlands is the only country where more than half can speak German without the 
language being an official language there). This pattern is mirrored also in survey responses 
that reflect attitudes to learning foreign languages (Table 2): 67% think English is a useful 
language for one's personal development and career whereas only 22-25% think the same 
about German and French. Attitudes on which languages children should learn are very 
similar (reassuringly, only 10% think no language is useful and only 2% believe children 
should learn no foreign language).  
 
Insert Figures 1-3 and Tables 1-2 about here. 
 
Proficiency in languages can change dynamically over time. In the absence of historical 
survey data on language skills going back a few decades, we can get useful insight on the 
dynamics of linguistic skills by considering age cohorts: as people usually learn languages 
during their school years, proficiency of different age groups approximates the changes in 
attitudes to languages. Table 39 reveals a striking pattern: the proficiency in most languages is 
remarkably stable over time: the share of young people (aged 15-29) speaking, for example, 
German and French, is nearly the same as the corresponding figure for the oldest group (60+ 
years of age). The only exception is English: more than half of young Europeans speak it, 
compared with barely a quarter of the oldest cohort. Moreover, while the share of those 
speaking English among the oldest differs little from the corresponding figures for German 
and French, English has taken a big lead among the younger cohorts.  
The rising prominence of English should not come as a surprise. It reflects the increasing 
globalization as well as accelerating openness of European countries to trade, investment 
flows as well as movement of people (whether tourists, labor migrants or students). English 
has effectively played the role of a modern lingua franca in this process. Language helps 
facilitate transactions between people in a way similar to the role of money: it serves both as 
medium of (communicative) exchange and store of (informational) value. The role of 
language in producing communicative benefits has been highlighted by, among others, Selten 
and Pool (1991), Gabszewicz, Ginsburgh and Weber (2005), Ginsburgh, Ortuno-Ortin and 
Weber (2007), and Ortega and Tangeras (2007). They model the benefits of speaking a 
particular language as embodied in the opportunities for communicating with other people 
speaking the same language: the term communicating should be understood broadly enough to 
include also engaging in productive activities and/or trade. The communicative benefits may 
differ across languages: learning Chinese, for instance, yields greater benefits now than 30 
years ago when China was poor and largely closed to the outside world. Similarly, the costs of 
learning a particular language are not uniformly distributed: some are better at learning 
languages than others, and some languages are easier to learn while others are more 
complicated. Importantly, the benefits of learning a language increase with the number of 
other speakers of that language. Hence, holding everything else constant, people would tend 
to choose to learn languages of large countries. Moreover, the attractiveness of a language 
rises further if a large number of other people decide to acquire it as well: given that learning 
languages is costly, people have a strong motivation to coordinate on a single language that 
                                                 
9 Again, the figures include both native speakers as well as those who speak the language with good or very 
good proficiency.  
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comes to play the role of a lingua franca instead of learning a broad range of different 
languages.10  
 
Insert Table 3 about here. 
 
The individual-level survey discussed above can be used to study the determinants of 
proficiency in foreign languages as well. The results are summarized in Table 4. Given that 
most languages are spoken almost exclusively by native speakers, the analysis can be carried 
out only for a few languages. English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Russian and Dutch 
are the seven most popular European languages and all have sufficient numbers of non-native 
speakers to permit the analysis.  
The results are illuminating. Younger people are more likely to speak English and 
German (the effect of age is in fact u-shaped for German, with the minimum attained at the 
age of 48). The opposite holds for Russian: middle-aged respondents more likely to speak it 
(the effect peaks at 55 years of age); this presumably reflects the fact that until 1990s, Russian 
was widely taught throughout the former Soviet Block. Having higher education, being self-
employed, having a managerial or white-collar occupation and living in an urban area 
increase the propensity to learn languages. It appears thus that those with higher education 
and more skills find it more beneficial (and probably also find it easier) to learn foreign 
languages. Somewhat less intuitively, being tall has a similar effect on the probability of 
speaking English and French. This can be explained by the positive relationship between 
one‟s height and economic wellbeing during childbirth (see Belot and Fidrmuc, 2010, and the 
references cited therein): growing in a more affluent household is likely to improve the 
acquisition of human capital, including foreign-language skills. More surprisingly, political 
orientation (self-declared) of respondents is also related to the probability of speaking English 
and French. The respondents were asked to position themselves on a scale between 0 and 10, 
with 1 representing extreme left and 10 standing for extreme right. Right-wing respondents 
are more likely to speak English while left-wing individuals are more likely to speak French; 
political orientation is not significant for any of the other languages (it is especially 
noteworthy that those who speak Russian are not any more leftist than those who do not). It is 
not obvious, however, what is the direction of causality here: whether left-wing political 
orientation makes one more likely to learn French while those with right-wing attitudes 
choose English, or whether the language that one learns in turn influences one‟s political 
opinion, perhaps through exposure to information and news from particular countries (note 
that the individuals included in this analysis are only those who speak the language in 
question as a foreign language and therefore this result does not simply reflect the fact that the 
average Frenchman may be more left-wing than the average Briton).  
The analysis accounts for the respondents‟ country of residence and the differences in the 
popularity of different languages in different countries are large. They are also not random. 
Dyen, Kruskal, and Black (1992) compiled indicators of linguistic proximity between 
languages: in essence, these measure the fraction of key words that have the same root. The 
correlation between the coefficient estimated for country-specific intercepts and linguistic 
proximity is 0.43 for English, 0.54 for French and 0.33 for German. Hence, more people learn 
a language if that language is relatively similar to their own.  
                                                 
10 For the same reason, as Selten and Pool argue in their article, artificial languages such as Esperanto are 
destined to fail as few people speak them and they have virtually no native speakers.  
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Insert Table 4 about here. 
 
Besides serving as a medium of communicative exchange and store of informational 
value, language also plays a third role: it is a tool of discrimination. Language not only 
facilitates communication between those who can speak it, at the same time it excludes from 
that communication all those who do not speak it sufficiently well. A good example is the 
Cockney rhyming slang which was devised by prison inmates in London who wanted to 
ensure that the prison guards could not understand them. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) discuss 
how language or accent specific to a particular region or ethnicity become a hallmark of one‟s 
identity. Deviating or not being able to speak the right language or with the right accent can 
be met with social sanctions: educated blacks in the US, for example, are disparaged for 
„speaking white‟. Those speaking the wrong language, similarly, may be subject to 
discrimination in the labor market (Lang, 1986) and in economic relations generally. 
The preceding analysis therefore suggests that individual socio-economic characteristics 
such as age, education or skill level are associated with the ability to speak foreign languages. 
Inability to speak a particular language, similarly, may lead to economic discrimination. Is the 
ability to speak a foreign language, therefore, associated with economic benefits such as 
higher wages? Most studies that consider this question look at the linguistic skills of 
immigrants and tend to find that speaking the destination-country language is indeed 
associated with a wage premium of up to 20% (Chiswick and Miller, 2002, 2010). The labor-
market position of immigrants, however, is rather specific and therefore the wage premium 
that accrues to them as a result of speaking another language is not directly comparable with 
the likely benefits accruing to Europeans speaking foreign languages. A unique study by 
Ginsburgh and Prieto-Rodriquez (2006) has sought to address exactly this question. They 
utilize data collected within the 2001 wave of the European Community Household Panel 
survey. Crucially, that survey asked the respondents in nine European countries (Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) about languages that 
they speak AND use at their workplace, allowing them to list up to two such languages. They 
find that the return to speaking a particular language depends on the relative scarcity of that 
language. The return to speaking English, for example, ranges from meager 5% in Denmark 
(where it is widely spoken) to 40% in Spain. Given that French and German are less common, 
the returns to speaking them are correspondingly higher, starting just under 20% for both (in 
Denmark for both languages) and as high as 50% for French and 60% for German (in both 
cases, the country with the highest return is again Spain). Toomet (2010) who consider ethnic 
Russians in Estonia and Latvia finds comparable results: those speaking English earn a wage 
premium of 15% in Estonia and as much as 40-60% (depending on data set used) in Latvia. 
Speaking the local language, in contrast, is not associated with any wage gain, despite the fact 
that not all ethnic Russians (who account for considerable share of the populations of these 
two countries) can speak both Russian and the local language.  
In summary, Europeans are at present increasingly proficient in foreign languages and 
especially in English. The share of those speaking English, furthermore, grows over time, as 
evidenced by the substantially higher proficiency rate for among the young. Most Europeans 
agree that learning and speaking foreign languages is important; again English takes a 
privileged place. Those who speak English and other languages, moreover, tend to enjoy 
higher wages, although these gains may gradually dissipate as more people acquire linguistic 
skills. Hence, one could argue that the extensive multilingualism as espoused by the EU since 
its inception is now less required than in the past. In the next section, I therefore address this 
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question explicitly, looking at the costs of multilingualism and at the possible scenarios for 
linguistic reform.  
 
3 Multilingualism in the EU: Assessment and Alternatives  
The EU is a leading consumer of linguistic services: translation and interpretation. Every year, 
it translates 1.8 million pages of written documents and provides interpretation for 11 
thousand meetings (depending on the linguistic complexity of the meeting, between 1 and 60 
interpreters may be required per meeting). This is costly: providing linguistic services is 
estimated to cost the EU over €1 billion per year (Fidrmuc and Ginsburgh, 2007). There are 
also non-monetary costs: the need for translation leads to delays in implementation of 
decisions and may result in legal ambiguity11. 
Fidrmuc and Ginsburgh (2007) consider the costs of multilingualism in the EU in the 
wake of the 2004 enlargement. Providing linguistic services was estimated to cost €1,045 
million at the time.12 With 20 official languages, this implies that each document has to be 
translated 19 times (regardless of in which language it was originally drafted). The average 
cost per language thus is €55 million per year (assuming all languages are equally difficult to 
translate to and from). The average cost per person would appear to be modest at €2.30 per 
person per year. This calculation, however, is greatly misleading as translation to each 
language does not benefit the same number of Europeans. Fidrmuc and Ginsburgh therefore 
compute the average cost per language and person, considering all speakers of a particular 
language and then considering only those who would be disenfranchised if their language did 
not enjoy the official status in the EU. The latter calculation is perhaps the best measure of the 
true cost of multilingualism because it only considers those who actually benefit from having 
their language included among the official languages of the EU.  
Table 5 reproduces the average costs per person and language for the 20 languages that 
had the official status in the EU following the 2004 enlargement (Irish, Bulgarian and 
Romanian were added in 2007 but these languages were not included in the analysis). These 
calculations consider all persons speaking a particular language (taking account of the fact 
that some languages are spoken in multiple countries), regardless of what other languages 
they may be able to speak. The approximate cost per language is thus divided by the 
population of the country or countries that speak it (note that the calculation only considers 
the relevant EU countries and thus do not take into account the fact that English, French, 
Spanish and Portuguese are widely spoken also outside Europe). Not surprisingly, English, 
French, Italian and especially German, spoken by large numbers of people, are the cheapest. 
In contrast, Latvian, Slovene and Estonian cost in excess of €20 per person per year and 
Maltese costs well over €100.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here. 
 
                                                 
11 The EU maintains that each official translation of a legal document has the same legal validity, regardless of 
whether the document was originally drawn up in that language or not.  
12 Portuese (2010, footnote 8) cites the EU Commissioner for Multilingualism, Leonard Orban, who estimated 
the cost of linguistic services as being €1.1 billion in 2008. This presumably includes also the effect of the 2007 
enlargement, suggesting that the addition of Irish, Romanian and Bulgarian had only a modest economic effect.  
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Table 6 takes the analysis of costs one step further by considering only those individuals 
who would be disenfranchised had their language lost the official status in the EU. Clearly, 
for assessing the benefit of accepting a given language as an official language of the EU, it is 
crucial to consider not only how many people live in the affected country but also how many 
of them do not speak other official languages. The cost per person, therefore, depends on the 
number of people speaking the language in question and the fraction of them who do not 
speak the other languages that would remain official languages of the EU. The choice of 
languages that would remain official is thus also critical. Four scenarios are considered in this 
respect: only English, English along with French or German, and all three languages together. 
The first column lists the population speaking each language and the next four columns report 
the numbers that would be disenfranchised in each linguistic scenario. In general, allowing for 
more official languages leads to lower disenfranchisement. Since the cost of providing 
linguistic services remains the same, the cost per disenfranchised person is therefore generally 
higher in the scenario with three or two official languages than in the English-only one 
(except, of course, when one of the official languages is irrelevant, in which case the cost 
remains the same). With English serving as the sole official language of the EU, large 
numbers of French, German, Italian, Polish and Spanish speakers would be adversely 
affected: between 25 and 42 million for each of these five languages. The costs of providing 
linguistic services for these languages are then correspondingly low: around or below €2 per 
disenfranchised person. Thereafter, the costs per disenfranchised person start to increase quite 
dramatically and can be as high as €800 for Maltese. Adding French or German or both to the 
list of official languages mainly affects the populations speaking these two languages; the 
costs for the others do not change too dramatically as a result. The main exceptions to this are 
Dutch (where adding French and to a lesser extent German makes a substantial difference, 
presumably because many Flemish Dutch speakers are proficient in French) and Czech, 
Slovak and Slovene, among whom German appears rather popular.  
The differences across languages reflect in part the different size of populations speaking 
them but this is only a part of the story. Another important factor is the number of people who 
can speak other languages. For example, the costs for avoiding disenfranchising a Dutch 
person is between those for Slovak and Lithuanian, two languages spoken by much smaller 
numbers of people. This is because the majority of Dutch speakers can also speak English, 
French or German.  
The last scenario, with English, French and German as official languages is probably the 
most realistic one: these three languages serve as working languages of the EU bureaucracy 
and therefore it is unlikely that any of them would ever be abandoned. Adopting this scenario 
would result in costs per language ranging from around €2 to 830. One may wonder whether 
spending €800 or even €100 is optimal and whether the countries in question would be 
prepared to spend a similar amount if the costs of providing linguistic services were to be 
borne entirely by them. The present policy of extensive multilingualism financed by the EU 
implies that the provision of linguistic services for small countries (languages) is cross-
subsidized by large countries. Similarly, large countries might in fact prefer to choose a more 
generous translation/interpretation regime if they were to pay for it by themselves (Fidrmuc 
and Ginsburgh develop a theoretical model that shows that the extent of linguistic services is 
increasing in the number of people speaking the language).  
 
Insert Table 6 about here. 
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The preceding analysis suggests that substantial savings could be made by reducing the 
extent of linguistic services provided by the EU. This is in fact already happening to some 
extent. The EU, for instance, increasingly relies on the so-called relay translation/interpreting. 
This practice means that written text or spoken word that is originally in, say, Estonian, will 
not be translated to all of the remaining official languages directly. Instead, it will be 
translated directly only to English, French and German (and possibly into a few other 
languages if such direct translations are possible). The remaining languages would then 
receive a translation from one of these core languages. These measures, while cutting the cost 
of multilingualism, fall well short of a fundamental linguistic-policy reform (and, 
furthermore, they lower the quality of linguistic services for all non-core languages, not only 
the marginal ones. The reasons for shying away from a true reform are clear: linguistic policy 
is one of the areas of EU policy that is subject to unanimity support. Therefore, it is highly 
likely that at least one country will oppose a move to downgrade a particular language. The 
degree of implementation of multilingualism, on the other hand, is determined by the 
European Commission. Therefore, we can expect the EU to introduce further cost-cutting 
measures without undertaking a fundamental reform of linguistic regime also in the future.  
Let us consider now what would be the optimal approach if the EU were able to garner 
sufficient support for a linguistic-policy reform aimed at reducing the number of official 
languages. How many official languages should the EU optimally maintain and which ones? 
Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh and Weber (2009) address this question and point out that the decision on 
the optimal number of official languages is ultimately a political one. Instead, they seek to 
identify the optimal sequence of languages: ordering the 23 languages currently used by the 
EU according to their contribution to reducing linguistic disenfranchisement. In other words, 
they identify the optimal sets of official languages for between 1 and 23 languages such that 
each optimal set of languages results in lower overall disenfranchisement than any other 
alternative set of languages of the same size.  
Table 7, reproduced from Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh and Weber (2009), presents the result. It 
reports the optimal ordering in which languages should be given the official status, should the 
EU decide on the choice of official languages anew. Alternatively, for any number m of 
official languages chosen by the EU decision makers, it reports what should be the mth 
language and also which languages should be given the official status before it. For each step 
in the sequence, the table also reports the resulting linguistic disenfranchisement.  
The first three languages are, not surprisingly, English, German and French. It is 
interesting to note that German does slightly better than French in reducing linguistic 
disenfranchisement as the second language in the sequence (see also Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh and 
Weber, 2004). With these three languages only, just over one third of Europeans remain 
disenfranchised. Italian, Spanish and Polish are the next three languages. Choosing these six 
languages would result in a disenfranchisement corresponding to approximately one sixth of 
the EU population. Once these six large languages are introduced into the sequence, adding 
additional languages leads only to modest reductions in disenfranchisement (and these gains 
are typically limited to a single country). The position of each language depends again not 
only on the number of speakers of each language but also on their ability to speak languages 
that have already been introduced into the sequence. In this way, for example, Hungarian 
appears in the eighth position, well ahead of languages such as Dutch and Swedish, which are 
spoken by larger or similar numbers of people. Note that several languages deliver 
approximately the same reduction in disenfranchisement: this is indicated by listing several 
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alternatives for the same position in the sequence.13 Finally, the analysis is ended when the 
remaining disenfranchisement falls to 1%; this target is attained with 19 languages. With 
merely 1% of the EU population still linguistically disenfranchised, the gains from adding the 
additional four languages are very limited.  
 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
 
Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh and Weber (2009) also construct similar sequences considering only 
young people (thus adopting a forward-looking approach and estimating disenfranchisement 
that would result in the future, assuming the coming generations will have the same linguistic 
proficiency as those currently young) and a sequence that considers linguistic proximity 
between languages (thus in effect assuming that one is not fully disenfranchised if a close 
enough a language is given the official status). The resulting sequences are broadly similar to 
that in Table 7 (except Polish and Hungarian are placed at higher positions in the sequence 
accounting for linguistic proximity as they share little similarity with the languages preceding 
them).  
Of course, the preceding analysis does not say which of these sets should be chosen. It 
only specifies which languages should be included in a set of official languages of size m, 
should the EU decision-making bodies choose to restrict the set of official languages to m. 
However, Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh and Weber point out that the marginal gain from adding 
additional languages falls sharply after the first six languages: English, German, French, 
Italian, Spanish and Polish. Therefore, choosing these six languages as the official languages 
of the EU might be a reasonable compromise solution, one that would result in relatively 
modest residual disenfranchisement rate.  
As I emphasized above, the probability of reaching a consensus in favor of linguistic 
reform in the EU is rather low, given that the reform would need to be approved with 
unanimity support. Nevertheless, if such a reform is implemented, then its benefits are likely 
to go beyond cost savings. Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2010) consider the impact of proficiency in 
foreign languages on international trade. It is well established in the trade literature that 
countries that share the same official language tend to trade more with each other. Fidrmuc 
and Fidrmuc, however, go one step further by considering also languages that are widely 
spoken as foreign ones. Specifically, they compute probabilities that two random individuals 
from two countries will be able to communicate together in English, French or German 
(regardless of whether the individuals are native speakers of any of these languages or 
whether they have learned them as foreign languages). The find that linguistic skills, and 
especially English, exert a significant and positive effect on trade flows in Europe. For 
example, their results suggest that raising proficiency in English in all EU countries to the 
level prevailing in the Netherlands would be expected to increase trade in Europe, ceteris 
paribus, by approximately three quarters.  
The gains from improving linguistic skills of Europeans are thus comparable to those that 
were envisaged from introducing the common currency in Europe. Crucially, while adopting a 
common currency is costly because a country must give up its national currency and 
autonomy over monetary policy, improving linguistic skills in foreign languages does not 
require abandoning national languages. Reducing the number of official languages in the EU 
                                                 
13 Note also that Russian, which is currently not an official language of the EU, would qualify for the ninth place 
in the sequence, the same position as Czech and Greek.  
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will increase the incentive for Europeans to invest into acquiring and improving proficiency in 
the core languages (importantly, changes in the linguistic regime at the EU level do not imply 
that the same linguistic-regime change would have to be implemented at the national level 
too). Once more Europeans speak English and other languages, trade between their countries 
is likely to grow and this will have a positive impact on economic growth and overall 
wellbeing.  
Another crucial implication of multilingualism is its effect on innovation. At present, EU 
countries maintain their separate patent systems: an innovator seeking to protect their 
invention in all 27 EU countries must apply for patent protection in each country separately. 
This is costly: not only it necessitates multiple fees but the relevant technical documentation 
needs to be translated into each country‟s official language. According to Van Pottelsberghe 
and Francois (2006), the cost of filing and protecting a patent for 20 years amounts to 
approximately €130,000 in the EU, compared with €17,000 in both the US and Japan.14 As a 
consequence, the number of claims per year (a patent application is composed of on average 7 
claims in Japan, 18 in Europe and 23 in the US) is 1 million in Europe, 3 millions in Japan 
and 8 million in the US. 
Hence, increasing the use of English and/or formal linguistic reform in the EU has the 
potential to translate into important economic gains in terms of increased trade and greater 
innovative activity alike. Again, this does not necessitate that the status of the national 
languages is diminished in any way, only that English receives greater (formal or informal) 
recognition in parallel to them. Substantial gains thus may be available at little cost.  
 
4 Conclusions 
The linguistic regime that continues to be in effect in the EU, extensive multilingualism 
allowing each country to nominate its national language as an official language of the EU, 
may have been optimal when the process of EU integration began but it is neither optimal nor 
practical at present. In 1957, when the EEC was founded, it included six countries that had 
four official languages among themselves. The scope for European policy making and the 
impact of EEC policies and decisions on national legal environments were limited. 
Importantly, the linguistic skills of Europeans were limited as well and there was no clear 
candidate for a lingua franca among the four EEC languages. 
At present, the EU has 27 member countries and 23 official languages. EU rules and 
decisions have wide-ranging impact on, and in fact supremacy over, policies and legal 
framework in the member countries. As the scope of EU activities and their legal and 
practical relevance increase, maintaining the same extent of multilingualism with 23 
languages as with four languages in the past is increasingly difficult and costly. It is also 
increasingly less needed: present-day Europeans increasingly speak foreign languages and the 
future generations are likely to continue this trend. English clearly plays the dominant role in 
Europe at present: it replaced French as the main language used by the EU bureaucracy and it 
is the most common foreign language that Europeans choose to learn or that they consider 
important. While the EU institutions continue to pay lip service to multilingualism, the 
Europeans themselves increasingly gravitate towards English playing the role of the European 
lingua franca.  
                                                 
14 It is possible to file the application with the European Patent Office initially only in English, French or 
German. Hower, the application needs to be subsequently validated (and the documentation translated) 
separately for each country for each patent protection is sought. See Van Pottelsberghe and Francois (2006) for 
more details.  
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Introducing unilingualism in the EU formally, however, would be premature and 
politically unacceptable at present. The share of Europeans who speak English well enough, 
while increasing, is far from being adequate for that. Unilingualism would thus result in 
excessive linguistic disenfranchisement. Moreover, the costs of maintaining a linguistic 
regime with multiple languages (while being lower than the costs of 23 official tongues) is 
modest compared to the benefits that it would entail. A policy of multilingualism with six or 
perhaps as few as three official languages would serve the EU well: it would ensure that the 
vast majority of Europeans is not excluded from EU affairs while keeping the costs 
manageable and helping avoid some of the ills of the current regime such as translation delays 
and backlogs, errors, and excessive use relay translations. It would also be similar to the 
linguistic regime applied by other international organization such as the UN. Importantly, 
implementing linguistic reform now would preempt the further rise in costs and complexity of 
linguistic relations in the EU in the wake of future enlargements. Last but not least, adopting a 
more restrictive linguistic regime would increase the incentive for Europeans to learn foreign 
languages. This, in turn, would have positive spillover effects in terms of higher wages and 
better opportunities to travel, study or work abroad as well as for their countries by boosting 
trade within Europe as well as with the rest of the world.  
Garnering political consensus for the reform, however, will be difficult as long as the 
present practice of applying unanimity to this policy area is maintained. Failure to implement 
the reform would lead to funds being spent on linguistic services that are increasingly of 
substandard quality and at the same time less and less required by the Europeans themselves.  
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Table 1 Distribution of Main European Languages (native speakers and those with good or very good proficiency)  
All Speakers English German French Italian Spanish Polish Dutch Russian Turkish 
Austria  45  99  6  5  2  0  0  1  1  
Belgium  41  13  71  3  3  1  68  0  1  
Bulgaria  16  6  4  1  1  0  0  25  10  
Cyprus  51  2  5  1  1  0  0  1  0  
Czech Rep. 16  19  2  0  0  2  0  15  0  
Denmark  66  27  3  1  2  0  0  0  0  
Estonia  25  8  0  0  0  0  0  68  0  
Finland  31  5  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  
France  20  5  99  5  7  0  0  0  0  
Germany  38  99  8  1  2  2  0  8  2  
Greece  32  6  5  2  0  0  0  2  1  
Hungary  8  9  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  
Ireland  99  2  9  0  1  1  0  0  0  
Italy 25  4  10  97  3  0  0  0  0  
Latvia 15  3  0  0  0  1  0  85  0  
Lithuania 14  4  1  0  0  13  0  74  0  
Luxemburg 39  88  89  5  1  0  1  0  0  
Malta 68  1  5  35  1  0  0  0  0  
Netherlands 77  57  19  0  3  0  99  0  0  
Poland 18  10  1  1  0  98  0  12  0  
  2 
Source: 
Special 
Eurobaro
meter 
243: 
European
s and 
their 
Language
s, 
Novembe
r-
December 2005. 
Portugal  15  2  9  1  4  0  0  0  0  
Romania  14  3  10  2  1  0  0  2  0  
Slovak Rep. 17  18  1  0  0  2  0  20  0  
Slovenia  41  21  2  9  1  0  0  0  0  
Spain  16  2  6  1  98  0  0  0  0  
Sweden  67  12  3  1  1  0  0  0  0  
UK 99  2  9  1  2  0  0  0  0  
EU27 37.4  24.9  19.9  13.3  11.1  8.4  4.9  4.6  0.5  
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Table 2 Attitudes on Usefulness of Main European Languages 
 
Useful Language  Children Should Learn  
 
English  German  French  Spanish  English  German  French  Spanish  
Austria  73  2  15  8  85  2  29  10  
Belgium  83  9  54  6  88  7  52  10  
Bulgaria  65  34  11  5  87  49  13  6  
Cyprus  93  17  34  3  98  18  50  2  
Czech Rep.  68  56  5  2  90  68  8  4  
Denmark  92  56  7  10  94  64  12  13  
Estonia  71  14  2  1  93  23  7  1  
Finland  86  18  8  4  84  24  11  3  
France  81  19  2  36  90  25  2  45  
Germany  81  5  27  13  89  3  44  17  
Greece  74  30  21  4  96  50  34  3  
Hungary  57  52  3  1  83  73  4  2  
Ireland  4  37  58  34  3  42  65  34  
Italy  82  15  25  15  85  17  34  18  
Latvia  70  17  3  1  94  28  6  1  
Lithuania  85  27  4  1  91  34  6  2  
Luxemburg  37  60  82  2  61  41  81  3  
Malta  88  5  12  2  89  12  23  2  
Netherlands  93  48  19  16  90  40  22  22  
  4 
Poland  70  45  5  2  89  69  7  1  
Portugal  51  5  31  6  87  8  58  7  
Romania  63  18  33  7  63  18  33  7  
Slovak Rep.  70  60  4  1  87  74  7  3  
Slovenia  79  61  4  2  97  69  7  3  
Spain  72  11  32  5  85  14  44  3  
Sweden  96  39  12  21  99  37  17  30  
UK  4  29  63  33  4  36  72  38  
EU27  67  22  25  15  76  28  33  19  
Source: Special Eurobarometer 243: Europeans and their Languages, November-December 2005. 
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Table 3 EU27 Proficiency in Main European Languages by Age Cohorts (native speakers and those with good or very good proficiency) 
      
 
All  15-29  30-44  45-60  > 60  
      
                  
English  37  55  41  32  24  
German  25  26  25  24  25  
French  20  22  19  20  19  
Italian  13  13  13  13  13  
Spanish  11  13  11  10  11  
Polish  8  8  8  8  8  
Dutch  5  5  5  5  5  
Turkish  0  1  1  0  0  
Russian  5  4  5  5  4  
                  
Source: Special Eurobarometer 243: Europeans and their Languages, November-December 2005. 
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Table 4 Determinants of Proficiency in Main European Languages 
 
English  French  German  Italian  
Female  0.236***  (0.059)  0.457***  (0.084)  -0.045  (0.073)  0.368***  (0.162)  
Age  -0.065***  (0.009)  0.005  (0.013)  -0.048***  (0.010)  0.007  (0.023)  
Age sqrd  0.0003***  (0.0001)  0.0001  (0.0001)  0.0005***  (0.0001)  -0.0001  (0.0002)  
Married  -0.065***  (0.047)  -0.048  (0.072)  -0.039  (0.057)  -0.361***  (0.131)  
Left-Right  0.031***  (0.010)  -0.033**  (0.015)  0.017  (0.012)  -0.031  (0.025)  
Sec. education  1.272***  (0.085)  1.014***  (0.118)  0.874  (0.104)  0.888***  (0.224)  
Tert. Education  2.321***  (0.088)  1.831***  (0.126)  1.492***  (0.108)  1.377***  (0.248)  
Still student  2.758***  (0.123)  2.437***  (0.187)  1.493***  (0.163)  1.394***  (0.343)  
Self-employed  0.460***  (0.086)  0.507***  (0.130)  0.300***  (0.119)  0.347  (0.243)  
Manager  1.118***  (0.073)  0.578***  (0.115)  0.725***  (0.094)  0.607***  (0.207)  
White collar  0.520***  (0.071)  0.210*  (0.116)  0.402***  (0.096)  0.108  (0.224)  
House person  0.059  (0.096)  -0.117  (0.149)  0.259**  (0.130)  -0.512*  (0.294)  
Unemployed  0.128  (0.103)  0.089  (0.180)  0.032  (0.144)  0.024  (0.307)  
Retired  0.177**  (0.090)  0.190  (0.135)  0.235**  (0.107)  0.184  (0.256)  
Height  0.022***  (0.003)  0.013***  (0.005)  0.003  (0.004)  0.008  (0.009)  
BMI  -0.091***  (0.026)  0.014  (0.057)  -0.032**  (0.015)  -0.052*  (0.031)  
BMI sqrd  0.001***  (0.000)  -0.001  (0.001)  0.0003  (0.0002)  0.0005  (0.0004)  
Small/medium town  0.305***  (0.050)  0.296***  (0.077)  0.101*  (0.062)  0.172  (0.140)  
Large town  0.730***  (0.055)  0.376***  (0.084)  0.184***  (0.068)  0.183  (0.141)  
Source: Special Eurobarometer 243: Europeans and their Languages, November-December 2005; own calculations. 
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Table 4 Determinants of Proficiency in Main European Languages (continued)  
 
Spanish  Russian  Dutch  
Female  0.202  (0.151)  0.102  (0.095)  -0.365  (0.268)  
Age  0.011  (0.022)  0.153***  (0.016)  0.022  (0.037)  
Age sqrd  -0.0002  (0.0002)  -0.0014***  (0.0002)  -0.0003  (0.0004)  
Married  -0.293***  (0.122)  0.096  (0.076)  -0.264  (0.216)  
Left-Right  0.007  (0.028)  0.023  (0.015)  0.067  (0.052)  
Sec. education  0.313*  (0.180)  0.788***  (0.137)  0.459  (0.350)  
Tert. Education  0.692***  (0.196)  1.430***  (0.145)  0.988***  (0.364)  
Still student  1.363***  (0.289)  1.205***  (0.240)  1.281**  (0.541)  
Self-employed  0.947***  (0.215)  -0.130  (0.144)  0.231  (0.414)  
Manager  0.575***  (0.211)  0.355***  (0.121)  0.072  (0.373)  
White collar  0.086  (0.221)  -0.052  (0.117)  0.253  (0.323)  
House person  0.386  (0.242)  -0.190  (0.194)  0.608  (0.414)  
Unemployed  0.234  (0.301)  -0.042  (0.161)  0.651  (0.401)  
Retired  0.581***  (0.233)  -0.246*  (0.130)  0.228  (0.430)  
Height  0.003  (0.008)  0.006  (0.005)  -0.023  (0.015)  
BMI  -0.071*  (0.040)  -0.044**  (0.018)  0.016  (0.048)  
BMI sqrd  0.0004  (0.0007)  0.0007***  (0.0002)  -0.0003  (0.0005)  
Small/medium town  0.104  (0.135)  0.135*  (0.081)  0.148  (0.220)  
Large town  0.381***  (0.137)  0.190**  (0.088)  0.515**  (0.248)  
Source: Special Eurobarometer 243: Europeans and their Languages, November-December 2005; own calculations. 
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Table 5 Costs per Person by Language, EU25 
 Pop Cost   Pop Cost 
German  90.1 0.6  Hungarian 10.1 5.4 
French 64.5 0.9  Swedish 8.9 6.2 
English 62.3 0.9  Slovak 5.4 10.2 
Italian 57.6 1.0  Danish 5.3 10.4 
Spanish 39.4 1.4  Finish 5.1 10.8 
Polish 38.6 1.4  Lithuanian 3.6 15.3 
Dutch 21.9 2.5  Latvian 2.4 22.9 
Greek 11.3 4.9  Slovene 2.0 27.5 
Portuguese 10.8 5.1  Estonian 1.4 39.3 
Czech  10.3 5.3  Maltese 0.4 137.5 
Source: Fidrmuc and Ginsburgh (2007)  
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Table 6 Costs per Disenfranchised Person by Language, EU25 
 
Total 
Population Disenfranchised Population (millions) 
Cost per person disenfranchised 
(EUR) 
  E EF EG EFG E EF EG EFG 
English 62.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
French 64.5 37.5 0 36.6 0 1.5 0 1.5 0 
German 90.1 42.1 40.3 0 0 1.3 1.4 0 0 
Italian 57.6 35.1 27.7 34.0 27.1 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.9 
Polish 38.6 30.9 30.1 25.9 25.5 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.2 
Spanish 39.4 25.2 22.5 24.8 22.1 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.5 
Hungarian 10.1 8.6 8.5 7.6 7.5 6.4 6.5 7.3 7.3 
Portuguese 10.8 7.0 6.4 6.9 6.3 7.8 8.6 8.0 8.8 
Greek 11.3 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.7 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.7 
Czech  10.3 7.8 7.8 5.6 5.5 7.0 7.1 9.9 10.0 
Slovak 5.4 4.7 4.6 3.9 3.8 11.7 11.8 14.1 14.3 
Dutch 21.9 8.4 4.3 5.6 3.3 6.5 12.9 9.8 16.9 
Lithuanian 3.6 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 19.1 19.3 21.2 21.7 
Finnish 5.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 27.7 27.7 29.1 30.0 
Latvian 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 29.8 30.2 33.7 34.2 
Swedish 8.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 29.4 30.9 32.5 34.3 
Estonian 1.4 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 56.9 56.9 63.4 63.7 
Danish 5.3 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.9 41.5 43.2 64.9 64.9 
Slovene 2.0 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.5 58.5 59.8 98.2 102.2 
Maltese 0.4 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 808.8 808.8 808.8 831.3 
Source: Fidrmuc and Ginsburgh (2007)  
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Table 7 Sequence of Optimal Sets of Official Languages, EU27 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10a 10b 10c 
EN 1 + GE 2 + FR 3 + IT 4 + SP 5 + PL 6 + RO 7 + HU 8 + PT 9 + CZ 9 + GR 9 + RU 
62.6 49.3 37.8 29.5 22.4 16.4 12.9 10.9 9.2 7.7 7.7 7.7 
            
11 12 13 14a 14b 15 16a 16b 17 18a 18b 19 
10a+ GR 11 + BG 12 + NL 13 + FI 13 + SW 14a+ SW 15 + LT 15 + SK 15a+ SK 17 + LV 17 + DK 18a+ DK 
6.2 5.0 4.0 3.3 3.3 2.7 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.3 1.3 1 
Source: Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh and Weber (2009)  
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Figure 1: Proficiency in English (native, very good or good proficiency) 
 
 
Figure 2: Proficiency in French (native, very good or good proficiency) 
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Figure 3: Proficiency in German (native, very good or good proficiency) 
 
 
